In this paper, we give an abstraction of multi-secret sharing schemes based on lagrange interpolating polynomial that is accessible to a fully mechanized analysis. The abstraction is formalized within the applied pi-calculus using an equational theory that abstractly characterizes the cryptographic semantics of secret share. Based on that, we verify the threshold certificate protocol in a convergent rewriting system suitable for the automated protocol verifier ProVerif.
Introduction
The mechanization of language-based security proofs has recently enjoyed substantial improvements that have further strengthened the position of language-based technologies as a promising approach for the analysis of complex and industrial-size cryptographic protocol. Owning to the fact that modern cryptography has invented more sophisticated primitives with unique security features that go far beyond the traditional understanding of cryptography to solely offer secrecy and authenticity of a communication, one of the central challenges in the analysis of complex and industrial-size protocols is the expressiveness of the formalism used in the formal analysis and its capability to model complex cryptographic operations. Secret share constitute such a prominent primitive.
Due to the complexity of multi-secret sharing schemes, it is very difficult to realize the mechanization of secret-sharing proof. In this paper, we give an abstraction of multi-secret sharing schemes based on lagrange interpolating polynomial that is accessible to a fully mechanized analysis. The abstraction is formalized within the applied pi-calculus using an equational theory that abstractly characterizes the cryptographic semantics of secret share. Based on that, we verify the threshold certificate protocol [4] in a convergent rewriting system suitable for the automated protocol verifier ProVerif [3] .
Review of the Applied Pi-calculus.
The syntax of the applied pi-calculus [4] is given as follows. Terms are defined by means of a signature Σ, which consists of a set of function symbols, each with an arity. The set of terms T Σ is the free algebra built from names, variables, and function symbols in Σ applied to arguments. We let u range over names and variables. Terms are equipped with an equational theory E, i.e., an equivalence relation on terms that is closed under substitution of terms and under application of term contexts (terms with a hole). We write
for an equality and an inequality, respectively, modulo E.
The grammar of processes is defined as follows. The null process AE does nothing; n.P generates a fresh name n and then behaves as P; if M = N then P else Q behaves as P if E M N =  , and as Q otherwise; u(x).P receives a message N from the channel u and then behaves as P{N/x}; u (N).P outputs the message N on the channel u and then behaves as P; P|Q executes P and Q in parallel; !P generates an unbounded number of copies of P.
3. An Equational Theory of Secret-sharing.
An Abstraction of Secret-sharing
Our abstraction of secret-sharing Σ SS is explained in the following. Secret-sharing process with threshold (l, t) is represented as a term SSP l, t (τ ), name τ is used to identify specified secret-sharing process, we abuse notation by writing τ l, t which represents SSP l, t (τ ); The secret key for secret share is represented as a term SSK i, j, k ( M , m, τ , F ), where M , called dealer parameters, denote sequence M 1 … M i of terms; while m, called the proof 's identity Id, can be used to identify different secret key in same secret-sharing process and we have m ≤ l. Similarly, the corresponding verification key for secret share is represented as a term of form SVK i, j, k ( M , m, τ , F ) and we have m ≤ l. Further, the secret share is represented as a term of form The values α and β in F constitute placeholders for the terms M i and N j . In our abstraction model, the relationship between secret and dealer parameters, player parameters can be defined through (i, j)-functions.
A Finite Specification of Secret-sharing
In this section, we specify a finite equivalent theory ,
TR h SS E
in terms of a convergent rewriting system. This theory turns out to be suitable for mechanized security protocol analysis. The central idea of our finite equivalent theory is to focus on the secret-sharing proofs used within the process specification and to abstract away from the additional ones that are possibly generated by the environment. This makes finite the specification of the equational theory.
First, we track each secret share generated, verified or combined in the process specification by a set TR of triples of the form (i, j, k, F ), where F is sequence of k (i, j)-functions of a secret-sharing scheme. Second, we record the arity h, g, p, q of the largest used in the process specification. For terms M and processes P, we let terms(M) denote the set of subterms of M and terms(P) denote the set of terms in P. We can now formally define the notion of (TR, h)-validity of terms and processes. Definition 3.2. A term Z is (TR, h)-valid if and only if the following conditions hold:
process P is (TR, h)-valid if and only if M is (TR, h)-valid for every M ∈ terms(P).
We check that each secret share generation, verification and combination is tracked in TR (condition1). We also check that for all secret-sharing proofs used in the process specification, the arity of dealer parameters, player parameters and (i, j)-functions is less or equal than h, respectively (condition3).
We now define the static compilation of term and process. 
Since F are uniquely determined by , ,
SVer and , , ,
be omitted from the protocol specification. Verification of secret shares with respect to verification key for secret shares is modeled by the following equational rule:
, ,
For combination of different secret shares with same secret in the same (l, t)-threshold secret-sharing process, it suffice to check whether the arity of secret shares is more that t. Thus, we include in
PCombin and , , ,
, , ,
SCVer is used to determine if secret can be computable from r different secret shares in a secretsharing scheme with threshold (l, t) and can be modeled as follow.
) for r> 1. (7) , , ,1
Thus, combination of r different secret shares with same secret in the same (l, t)-threshold secretsharing process is modeled by the following equational rules:
, , , 
Mechanized Analysis of Threshold Certificate Protocol
We then analyze the security properties of (l, t)-threshold certificate protocol [4] with
The goal of threshold certificate protocol is to enable secret-sharing schemes to resist player's cheating. The threshold certificate protocol is composed of three subprotocols: the secret distributing protocol, the secret reconstruction protocol and the secret recovering protocol. The secret distributing protocol allow players and off-line TTP to get secret share and (l, t)-threshold agreement certificate from dealer. The secret reconstruction protocol enable more than t players to reconstruct the secret. The secret recovering protocol enable more than t players and off-line TTP to recover the secret.
We assume dealer has a key-pair called endorsement key (EK) for each secret-sharing scheme as well as a publicly known identity bsn D . 
Secret distributing protocol

ttpss). dealer = vpi. vSK. vN .(!c(bsn ,pk(SK)) | dealer 1 | dealer 2 ).
Here the define statement defines an abbreviation ssproof for the (i, j)-function we use in all secret-sharing proofs.
Secret reconstruction protocol
After successfully executing the secret distributing protocol, each player get secret share and a (l, t)-threshold agreement certificate from dealer. Players sscert , pk(SK)) = true or not, for each j = 1, 2, ..., k. If the number of the certificates which pass the verification is less than t, then they stop the procedure according to the (l, t)-threshold access structure. Otherwise, they perform the following steps. 
SK).
In our calculus, we can model the player in the secret reconstruction protocol as follow: (ID j , ttpss, ttpcert) .
c(= ID , ss).
,1 i cp (ss).
. 
Secret recovering protocol
Suppose that some of the players don't submit their (l, t)-threshold secret shares. The remaining players may send {( In our calculus, we can model the TTP in the secret recovering protocol as follow: 
Authenticity of the protocol
We will now discuss the main security property of the threshold certificate protocol, the authenticity property, and how to model it in our calculus. Firstly, we can define this protocol as follow:
The security goal of threshold certificate protocol is to enable secret-sharing schemes to resist player's cheating. Thus, any player who submits a false (l, t)-threshold agreement certificate will be detected. And, no information about the secret shares can be computed from the cheating.
GS(ID G , ID j , t) is defined to include all the sets which contain t elements different from ID j in ID G . Thus, the authenticity property of threshold certificate protocol is defined as the fulfillment of the following trace properties:
Which means that if a player obtains the secret sign(h(N ), SK), then either there exists at least t − 1 other players who verify at least t−1 players' certificates in the same run or the secret sign(h(N ), SK) is from TTP to resist player's cheating.
Trace properties such as above can be verified with the mechanized prover ProVerif. In ProVerif script, the parallel compositions are replaced with replicated inputs, for example, , s) , respectively. ProVerif shows that the threshold certificate protocol satisfies the authenticity property.
Conclusion
In this paper, we apply an abstraction of multi-secret sharing schemes based on lagrange interpolating polynomial to the threshold certificate protocol, yielding its first mechanized security proof within the applied pi-calculus. On the basis of this, we realize the security proof with the mechanized prover ProVerif and our results shows that the threshold certificate protocol satisfies the authenticity property.
